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In the Supreme Court .
of the State of Utah
CLCARFIELD STATE BA:t-;'"K,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

"·
PETERS PLLJMBING AND HEATIKG
COMPANY, SALT LAKE AUTO
AUCTION 11'\C, Al\'D 11\'DEMNITY
INSURANCE COMPANY Ofl
l\'ORTH AMERICA,
DefendantJ and Re_rpondents.

Case No.
9043

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellant has set forth a stiltcment of facts in rather
considerable detail and it appears to be in most respeds correct.
Inasmuch as the is~ues as to all respondents are the same,
except in very limited situations which will be treated separately in the brief, tbe respondents ha;·e all joined in this
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brief and the same is submitted on behalf of each and ali of

th=.

It is deemed advisable, however, to state very briefly the
relative situations and positions of the parties to this proceeding. Salt Lake Auto Auction is in the wholesale automobile
business and sells, through its auction, automobiles to dealers
only. Salt Lake Auto Auction as such wholesaler is a licensed
automobile dealer in Ctah. The Respondent Indemnity Insurance Company of North America is the surety on the dealer's
bond of Salt Lake Auto Auction.
George B. West d/b/a West Motor Company was a reta~
used car dealer. West entered into an agreement with Salt
Lake Auto Auction to purchase a motor vehicle which is the
subject of this action. Possession of the car was given to West.
Salt Lake Auto Auction was to retain the title to the vehicle
until paid for, and under instructions from West transmitted
the title documents along with a draft to West's bank, which,
incidentally was and is the plaintiff in this action. West failed
to pay the draft and thereby obtain the title, and said draft,
together with the title was returned by the Bank to Salt Lake
Auto Auction, who kept and retained the title. In the meantime,
West, without the knowledge or consent of Salt Lake Auto
Auction, entered mto the conditional sales contract for the
sale of said automobile to Respondent Peters Plumbing &
Heating Company, said conditional sales contract being as·
signed by West to the plaintiff and Appellant herein, all as
appear from the face of the documents in the files.

As further appears from the files and records, including
the affidavits supporting the motions for summary judgment,
4
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neither West, nor his assignee, the Appellant herein, ever did
deliver title to said motor vehicle to Peters Plumbing & Heating
Co,mpany, or to any person or agency on behalf of Peters
Plumbing and Heating Company, including the .Motor Vehicle
'
'
Department of Utah, within twenty"four hours or at all, for
the very good reason that West never did have nor.never did
become entitled to ha\·e the title or indicia of title to said
motor vehicle.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE
PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT TO ALLEGE OR SET FORTH
ALTERNATE OR INCONSISTEKT CLAIMS IS NOT AN
ISSUE IN THIS ACTION.
POINT 1I
THERE ARE NO GENUINE ISSUES OJ; MATERIAL
FACTS.
POINT

[fl

SALT LAKE AUTO AUCTION AND INDEM!\ITY
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA WERE
AND ARE F.!\TITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW BECAUSE:
(A) THE PROVISIONS OF S.ECTIO:\JS 41-3-2 AND
41-3-3 PROHIBIT PLAINTIFF FROM MAINTAINING ITS ACTION.

5
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(B) THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL, AS REFERRED
TO IN THE CASE OF HEASTON VS. MAR.
TINEZ IS NOT APPLICABLE TO SALT LAKE
AUTO AUCTION OR INDEMNITY INSUR.
ANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA.

(C) THE CASE OF HEASTON VS. MARTINEZ IS
UNSOUND AND SHOULD BE REVERSED.
(D) THE PROVISIONS OF SEC. 41+2 ARE NOT
APPLICABLE TO SALT LAKE AUTO AUC
TION.
POINT IV
PETERS PLUMBING & HEATING COMPANY JS
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE QUESTION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE
PLAINTIFF HAS A RIGHT TO ALLEGE OR SET FORTH
ALTERNATE OR INCONSISTENT CLAIMS IS NOT AN
ISSUE IN THIS ACTION.
Respondents have no argument with the right of the
plaintiff to set forth different, alternative and even incon·
sistent claims in his complaint; nor do we now, nor did we
at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, contend
that Respondents were entitled to rely on allegations most

6
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favorable to them, or any of them, and ignore allegations most
favorable to the plaintiff, if in fact there were any real and
material issues of fact. Under the theory of the Respondents
and each of them, however, we do not feel that there arc-any
allegations, consistent or not, which give rise to inaterial issues
of fact. This phase of the case will be developecl in connection
w1th the arguments on other points herein.
In passing, however, we suggest that even under the pres
ent liberal rules of pleading, and including Rule 8 (e) ( 2)
quoted by Appellant, a plaintiff may not, in the same count
allege facts as relates to one defendant and then take the
position that if such allegation of fact favors another defendant
in the action, that as to such other defendant plaintiff can
ignore the allegation and claim it does not bind him except
as it suits his best purposes and as it relates to the defendant
to whom he would have it relate.

POINT II
THERE ARE NO GEKUIKE ISSUES OP MATERIAL
FACTS.
Appellant contends that as between the Appellant and
the Respondents Salt Lake Auto Auction and Indemnity Insurance Company of Korth America, there are two issues of
fact present.
First, it is contended, 1S the issue "Whether or not plaintiff
ts a bona fide purchaser for value of the conditional sales
contract covering the sale of the Chevrolet automobile tu Peters
Plumbing and Heating Company by the dealer, George B.

7
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West." We do not know what Appellant means by "bona fide
purchaser for value of the conditional sales contract," Cer·
tainly, Appellant cannot seriously contend that such a contract
is in the category of a negotiable instrument so that it is taken
free of any defenses. Hence, appellant must simply mean that
the contract was taken by appellant without any knowledge
as to infirmities therein. The contract which is attached as a
part of the complaint shows on its face that appellant took it
simply as an assignee of GEORGE B. WEST, with full re·
course, the assignment stating that "the undersigned hereby
sells and assigns the within contract and all of his, its or their
right, title and interest in and to the property subject thereto
* * * ."' Hence, appellant took and received only what West
had and subject to defenses against West. This general rule
is stated in CJS, Assignments, Sec. 84 as follows:
"No matter what the property or thing passed, the
right or title acquired by the assignee is simply that
previously possessed by the assignor and no more."
Be that as it may and regardless of whether or not the
appellant took the assignment in good faith without any
knowledge of infirmities in the title, this is not a material
issue, by reason of the statutory restrictions of Sections 41·J.2
and 41·3·3 UCA 1953 which will be referred to in detail in
argument of other points in this brief, and which statutes
specifically provide that the plaintiff and appellant has no
standing in the Court.

Second, it is contended by appellant that there is an issue
of fact as to "whether or not the automobile was sold to
GEORGE B. WEST giving title or ownership of such auto·
8
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bile to WEST at the time he sold· the same to Peters Plumbing
& Heating Company and sold a conditional sales contract to
plaintiff.''
This again, if an issue, is not an issue of material fact
for the reasons above set forth. Furthermore, as appellant
states, his first course of action is purely and simply a count
in claim of delivery. No allegation is made th:it
Salt
Lake Auto Auction had possession of, or was withholding,
~;aid motor vehicle from the plaintiff and appellant. Hence,
no relief could be had against Salt Lake Auto Auction on that
cause of action. On the second cause of action, the allegations
clearly set forth that appellants were purely and simply assignees of GEORGE B. WEST of the conditional sales contract
and that West failed to deliver title to the automobile within
48 hours as required by Sec. 41-3-2 above referred to. Such.
being the case, the appellant has no standing in Court and
hence the matters referred to, even though an issue of fact,
are not material issues of fact.

the

The re'J.SOns why said matters referred to by appellant,
even though issue of fact, arc not material issues of fact will
become apparent in connection with the arguments on the
other points which follow in this brief, and, hence repetitious
argument under this point will be omitted.
POINT III

SALT LAKE AUTO AUCTION AND INDEMNITY
INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA WERE
AND ARE ENTITLED TO JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW BECAUSE:
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(A) The provisions of Sections 41-3-2 and 41-3-3 {H'ohibit
plaintiff from maintaining its action.
Preliminarily, it should be mentioned that it is obvious
that Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, as surety
on the bond of Sa.lt Lake Auto Auction, cannot be held in the
action unless there is first some basis for holding Salt lake
Auto Auction.
In any light, the undisputed facts as shown by the pleadings and :files of this case are that Salt Lake Auto Auction
delivered possession to the car in question to George B. West,
an automobile dealer, said respondent, Salt Lake Auto Auction
retaining the indicia of title to the car; that West purported
to sell and did deliver said car to defendant Peters Plumbing
& Heating Company under the conditional sales contract Exhibit "A" attached to the complaint; that West assigned said
contract to the appellant without recourse; that neither West
nor his assignee the appellant herein, could or did deliver
to the vendee (Peters Plumbing & Heating Company) and
endorsed according to law a certificate of title issued for said
motor vehicle by the State Tax Commission.
Sec. 41-3-2 and 4-3-3 UCA 1953 provides as follows:

"41-3-2-Certificate of title to vendee--Every person,
firm. or corporation upon the sale and delivery of any
used or second hand motor vehicle shall within fortyeight hours thereof deliver to the vendee, and endorsed
according to law, a certificate of title, issued for said
vehicle by the state tax commission.''
"41-3-3-Penalties for violation of act-No action
or right of action to recover any such motor vehicle,
or any part of the selling price thereof, shall be main10
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tained in the courts of this state by any such dealer
or vendor, his successor or assigns, in any case wherein
such vendor or dealer shall have failed to comply
with the terms and provisions of this act, and such
vendor or dealer, upon conviction for the violation of
any of the provisions of this act shall be deemed guilty
of a misdemeanor and shall be punished by a fine of
not more than $299 or by imprisonment for not more
than six months in the county jail, or by both such fine
and imprisonment."
Nothing could be more clear than that neither West nor
his successor and assigns (the plaintiff-appellant herein) could
maintain any action in the courts of this State to recover the
motor vehicle or any part of the selling price. No statute .:ould
be drafted in language more clear.
The appellant has contended that because the contract
provides that "the seller may assign this contract without notice
to purchaser and when assigned it shall be free from any
defense, counterclaim or cross complaint by the purcli.aser,"
that the defense of the above statute, and all other defenses
are gone. It is a proposition of law concerning which there
seems to be no conflicts in the authorities, that a statute enacted
for the protection of the public and particularly a criminal
statute, may not be nullified by an anticipatory waiver. If
such were not the rule, in every contract where one party might
have some little advantageous position, such party could and
no doubt would insert a provision that all statutory and other
defenses which the other party had were waived. The rule
is set out in 56 Am. Jur., Waiver Section 7, as follows:
"Because requirements of a statute enacted for the
public good may not be nullified or varied by private
11
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contract, the donee of a private right created by 5tatute
for the public good does not have the legal right to
make an anticipant waiver of such right."
It was for just such cases as the one before this Court
that the statutes relied upon a5 above set forth were enacted.
If by the simple expedient of including a waiver in the contract,
the statutes could be nullified, the Legislature might as well
refrain from passing any regulatory statutes and simply leave
the public to the obligation of protecting itself contractually,
regardless of the difference in bargaining powers between the
parties to the action and regardless of the belief of the Legislature as to the necessity in the public interest, for regulating
certain businesses and of providing penalties for failure to
comply with such regulations.

The statutes referred to above say clearly that the appellant has no right to maintain action in the courts of this State,
and all defendants and respondents herein proceed upon the
assumption that the statutes mean what they clearly say. The
wording of Sec. 41-3-3 in fact effectively divests the Courts
of this State of jurisdiction in any action brought by a vendee
or his assignee in connection with a transaction wherein Sec.
41-3-2 has not been complied with. Certainly, by a printed
provision in a contract provided and furnished by the vendor
of an automobile, jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the
Courts of this State in direct contravention to a statutory
prohibition.

(B) The doctrine of estoppel, as t"eferred to in the case
of Heaston z·.r. Martinez is not applicable to Salt Lake Auto
Auction or Indemnity Insurance Company of North America.
l2
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Contention is made by the appellant that the Salt Lake
Auto Auction is estopped to claim a title or .lien superior to
plaintiff's (appellant's) and cites as authority therefor the case
of Heaston vs, Martinez, 3 Utah 2d 259; 282 P 2d 833. Certainly the doctrine of that case does not extend to the extent
of estopping the wholesaler of an automobile from asserting
his claim against the retailer to whom he delivered the car
and who fraudulently sold the same without paying for or
acquiring any title or indicia of title thereto. Plaintiff as
assignee of West's interest in the conditional sales wntract
must stand in West's shoes. West could certainly not assert
any claim against Salt Lake Auto Auction and surel.y neither
can his assignee.
Furthermore, the appe!lant Bank, as the financing institution dealing in automobile financing, is not in the same position
as the customer who enters the used car lot to buy a vehicle.
The Bank knows, or certainly should know, that in order for
a dealer to have any right to sell a motor vehicle he must have
in his possession the title doo-:ments thereto. properly endorsed
as provided by Sec. 41-1-65 1953, which provides as follows:

''Transfers /u dealers-When the transferee of a
vehicle is a dealer who holds the same for resale and
operates the same only for purposes incident to a re.
sale and displays thereon the registration plates issued
for such vehicle, or when a transferee does not drive
such vehicle or permit it to be driven upon the highways,
the transferee shall not be required to obtain transfer
of registration of such vehicle or forward the certificates
of title and registration to the department, but such
transferee upon tran~Jerdng his title or interest to
another person shall execute and acknowledge an
Ll
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

assignment and warranty of title upon the certificate
of title and deliver the same and the certificate of registration to the person to whom such transfer is made."
It was incumbent upon the appellant before accepting

the conditional sales contract to require some evidence of
title thereto from the dealer from whom they accepted the
assignment. The assignment of the contract on the reverse of
Exhibit "A"' shows by its clear words that the Bank, in dealing
with the dealer West, relied upon West and upon his warranties as to title. Appellant can point to nothing which the
defendant Salt Lake Auto Auction did or failed to do which
in any wise controlled or influenced appellant's action in
either accepting or rejecting the assignment of the conditional
sales contract. No representations were made and no thing
was done by Salt Lake Auto Auction which caused or could
have caused the appellant Bank to alter or change the manner
in which it dealt with West in connection with the acceptance
of the assignment of the conditional sales contract. Had Salt
Lake Auto Auction registered the motor vehicle and shown
itself as the legal owner thereon on a title issued by the Utah
State Motor Vehicle Department and had Salt Lake Auto
Auction held such a title so showing its name as the legal
owner thereof, such, under the situation in this case, would not
have in any way affected the actions of the appellant Jlank.
It is obvious appellant took the assignment solely on the
faith and representations of its own assignee and without any
representations or action on the part of Salt Lake Auto Auction
concerning which it did or reasonably could rely in connec·
cion with its dealings with George B. West, except that Salt
Lake Auto Auction gave bare possession of the motor vehicle
to West.
14
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We submit that the Heaston case did not go to such an
extreme as to raise an estoppel in favor of the Bank, as the
assignee of the wrongdoer, and against the owner of the motor
vehicle.
Appellant cites as further authority in its favor the case of
jones vs. Commercial Investment Trust Company, 64 Utah 151
220 P. 896. That case is not in any respect in point. That was
a so-called "floor plan" case. The motor company was pur"
chasing cars from the factory and the same were financed and
floored by the defendant. The automobile dealer received a
bill of sale for each automobile and on receipt thereof paid
20% of the price of the car, plus freight. Title was transferred
to the finance company by an instrument called a negotiable
trust receipt which provided that the dealer was to display
and sell the car, and upon such sale was to remit the purchase
price of the finance company. The dealer did so sell, but failed
to remit. The trust receipt documents on their face, and if
displayed to the buyer, or to his financing institution, would
have shown the right and in fact the intention for the dealer
to sell and dispose of the car and collect the money therefor
on behalf of the company which was carrying the .floor plan
financing. \Ve submit that the circumstances are so unlike our
case as to require no comment.

(C) The case of Heaston
should be ret•tfJed.

~·s.

Martinez is unsound and

Until the case of Heaston VJ. Alartinez was decided, no
proposition seemed more clearly settled than that in order to
transfer title to a motor vehicle and deprive the owner of the
rights thereto, it was unnecessary that the actual certificate
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of ownership be endorsed, delivered and a new certificate of
registration and certificate of ownership issued. The publlc
generally and people dealing in thfO purchase and sale of automobiles as a business relied upon the provisions of Sec. 41-1-72
UCA 1953, which provides that until such issuance of the
new certificates of registration and ownership "delivery of
any vehicle required to be registered shall be deemed not to
have been made and title thereto shall be deemed not to have
passed and said intended transfers shall be deemed to be incomplete and not to be valid or effective for any purpo>e."'
Likewise, until said case, those engaged in the wholesale
and retail buying and selling of motor vehicles felt secure in
the belief that the law was well established, that the me[e
entrusting of bare possession of a motor vehicle by the owuer
thereof, even to one who habitually sells such goods, without
at the time giving to such person indicia of ownership, would
not jeopardize the right of the owner to claim his property as
against someone who purchased from the one to whom the
property was entrusted. Among those persons who were dealing in the wholesale and retail buying and selling motor ve·
hides, the practice had become almost uniform in connection
with dealings between motor vehicle dealers that the owner
or wholesaler of a motor vehicle, in arranging to sell a
vehicle for resale would deliver possession of the motor vehicle
to that dealer and, if cash were not paid at the time, would
transmit the title documents to the purchasing dealer's bank
with a draft; that the purchasing dealer would then pay the
draft and obtain the title papers, but that until such payment
was made and said title papers obtained, the wholesaling
dealer need not ha\·e any worries about his right to the motor

16
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vehicle. This orderly and customary method of doing business
has now been thrown into utter confusion and, in the light
of the Heaston vs. J11artinez case, such wholesale dealers have
no means at their command of protecting their interests in
motor vehicles which they contract to sell and do deliver to
other dealers for resale, unless they demand the full cash
purchase price at the time possession of such motor vehicles
are delivered.
Untill-Ieaston lJS. 111at·tinez case came down, such motor
vehicle dealers felt secure in the belief that both under the
motor vebicle statutes and under the statutes as relates to
sales of goods, they were securely protected by retaining the
documents of title until payment was made for the motor
vehicle; unless, of course, they did something in addition to
giving bare possession of the car to the retail dealer which
would mislead some person who was dealing with such dealer.

We submit that the Court ought again to review the
situation as relates to the law of the lfeaston ~·s. Martinez
case. We call the Comt's attention to the various authorities
with regard to the principles of law which we feel ought to
prevail. In 46 Am. Jur. at page 620, Sec. ·158, the rule is stated
as follows:

"It is a general rule as regards personal property
that title, like a stream, cannot rise higher than its
source; and therefore, it is a general principle that a
seller without title cannot transfer a better title than
he has, unless some principle of estoppel comes into
operation against the person claiming under what
would otherwise be the better title, as where the owner
by some direct and unequivocal act has clothed the
seller with the indicia Of ownership, or unless the
17
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•

seller has authority from the owner. In other words,
the seller of property other than negotiable securities
can .?rdinarily convey no greater rights than he himself
has.
In Blashfield, Volume 7, Section 4357, it is stated:

"A person who purchases an automobile from ~
dealer without obtaining the title papers, or in relianc~
on the dealer's promise to furnish the title papers late!
without making any eHort to ascertain the true ownership, acquires no title as against the owner, where the
owner, for example, had attached the title papers to
a draft and had sold and delivered the automobile to
the dealer subject to payment of the draft, which was
never paid."
The same subject is discussed in Williston on Sales,
Sections 313 and 314, wherein the rule is stated to be that
entrusting possession of goods, even to one who habitually
sells such goods, does not without more create an estoppel.
Sec. 313 reads in part as follows:
"Although entrusting possession to another may
lead an innocent third person to believe the posse1.Sor
i~ the owner, no court has gone so far as to hold that
the mere entrusting with possession would preclude
the owner from asserting his title. If the owner of
goods is responsible for or cognizant of no other de·
ceptive circumstances, it is an entirely proper thing
for him to entrust another with the goods either for the
advantage of the owner or of the possessor, and the
law has never attempted to debar the owner from so
doing * * *"
This Court in the Heaston t·.r. JL1fti!lez case reasoned,
in the majority opinion, that Sec. 41-1-72, which requires the
actual issuance of a .new certificate of registration and owner·
18
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ship before any transfer is valid for any purpose, does not
apply in connection with situations such as in this case because
of the provisions of 41"1-65, which reads as follows:
"When the transferee of a vehicle is a dealer who
holds the same for resale and operates the same only
for purposes incident to a resale * * * the transferee
shall not be required to obtain transfer of registration
of such vehicle or forward the certificates of title and
registration to the department, but such transferee upon
his title or interest to another person shall execute and
acknowledge an assignment and warranty of title upon
the certificate of title and deliver the same and the
certificate of registration to the person to whom such
transfer is made."
We submit that even under such reasoning of the Court,
nevertheless, at least Sec. 41-1-65 ought to be' complied with
before any transfer would be effective as behveen dealers.
In other words, in order for any transfer to be effective between
dealers, the transferor must at least execute and acknowledge
an assigrunent and warranty of title and deliver the same to
his transferee. Persons ought to be bound to know the law
and we submit that if Sec. 41-1-72 under ordinary circumstances is a notice statute and that persons are presumed to
know the laws as related therein, that Sec. 41-1-65 is also a
statute which people ought to be presumed to know and that
a purchaser ought then at least to be bound to inquire of the
retail automobile dealer and say, "Let me see the assignment
and warranty of title."
But going further with regard to the case of Heaston tiS.
Martinez, which case, of course, was based solely upon the
doctrine of estoppel, we submit that under the factual situation
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there, and, of course, similarly under the factual situation in
the case now before this Court, there can be no basis for
application of the doctrine of estoppel as we have always.
known it in the law. As pointed out so clearly in the dissentingopinion of Mr. Justice Henroid, the test as to whether there
IS

an estoppel ought to be
"What has the owner given to the seller which makes
it appear to the BUYER that the seller is authorized to
sell? Indicia of ownership amounting to a representation upon whicb an estoppel might be bottomed is

determined by looking at the facts through the eyes of
a reasonable buyer, who reasorutbly can believe the
seller has authority to sell-not through the eyes of
the owner."
The only thing which the buyer of this motor vehicle
could see (insofar as anything which the Salt Lake Auto
Auction did) was plain, ordinary, naked possession. There
was nothing Salt Lake Auto Auction did, nothing it said,
nothing it delivered to the retail dealer West, except-that it
gave him bare possession of the motor vehicle. What act of
Salt Lake Auto Auction, or what other thing than bare possession was there or could there have been on which it could
be said that either the purchaser, Peters Plumbing and Heating
Company, or the plaintiff Bank relied? What did Salt Lake
Auto Auction do or give which made it appear to any third
person that George B. West was authorized to sell the motet
vehicle?
What ran a person do to protect himself when he lets
someone take bare possession of his property if the doctrine of
Heaston r·s. Martinez is to stand? We assume the greatest pro20
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tection and notice of ownership might have resulted in Salt
Lake Auto Auction had it, before delivering the motor vehicle
to West, registered the automobile in its name with the Utah
State Tax Commission and had a Utah title issued in the
name of Salt Lake Auto Auction and then retained that title
in its possession. Let us assume it had done just that. Would
that have changed the picture in any regard so far as West,
or his purchaser, Peters Plumbing and Heating Company, or
the plaintiff bank, as assignee of the sales contract, are concerned? If Salt Lake Auto Auction gave bare possession of the
car toW est and retained the title so issued in its name, it would
have made no difference whatsoever in this situation, insofar
as any appearances are concern::d which could be observed by
either West's purchaser or the plaintiff bank. Such would
have given neither of them more to see when they dealt w1th
West than they actually saw under the conditions which
existed. Inquiry by Peters Plumbing Company or by the bank
under the state of the title as it actually existed would have
disclosed that there was no title in West, or at least that
West could not produce one. Again, we say; "W'here, then,
was any slight thing, in addition to- bare possession, which
Salt Lake Auto Auction gave to West or did which can be
said to have in any way influenced the mind or thinking
of either West's purchaser or the plaintiff bank in this
transaction so as to raise an estoppel as against Salt Lake
Auto Auction, the owner of the motor vehicle?
We submit that however the matter is viewed, the case of
Heatson vs. Martinez stands simply for the proposition that
the giving of bare possession of one's property to another
is sufficient to raise an estoppel. We further submit that such
21
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is not sound law; that the matter ought to be reviewed and
that case ought to be specifically and directly overruled.
(D) The provisions of Sec. 41-3-2 are not applicable to
Salt Lake Auaion.

Sec 41-3-2, upon which plaintiff tests its claim against
Salt Lake Auto Auction and its insurance carrier, Indemnity
Insurance Company of North America, provides:
"Every person,'firm, or corporation upon the sale and
delivery of any used 01 second hand motor vehicle
shall within forty-eight hours thereof deliver to the
vendee, and endorsed according to law, a cet'tificate
of title, issued for said vehicle by the State Tax Cummission."

The case of Heaston rs. Martinez, if it stands dearly for
any proposition, stands for the proposition that Sec. 41-1-65,
relating to transfers to dealers, makes it unnecessary to have,
and in fact contemplates that there shall not be, a "certificate
of title issued * * * by the State Tax Corrunission" for a
vehide, where the transfer is to a dealer. The majority opinion
in the Heaston case rests upon the proposition that the vehicles
were not required to be registered in the dealer's name, nor
was the dealer required to forward to the Motor Vehicle
Depl!rtment the certificates of title and registration. Such being
the case, as to the transaction between Salt Lake Auto Auction,
which is the wholesale dealer, and \Vest, who was the dealer
who purchased from Salt Lake Auto Auction, there was not
in existence any "certificate of title issued for said vehicle by
the State Tax Commission" (this being a foreign title)-the
statutes neither required nor contemplated that any such cer·
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tificate be obtained; and hence the provisions of Sec. 41-3-2
cannot possibly apply.
Such being the case, there is no violation of any provision of the Motor Vehicle Act alleged which would be the
basis for a claim against Salt Lake Auto Auction or the surety
on its dealer's bond under the provisions of Sec. 41-3-18
UCA 1953, or at all.
POINT IV
PETERS PLUMBING & HEATING COMPANY IS
ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS A MATTER
OF LAW.

As argued and set forth above, if Sec. 43-3-2 and 43-3-3
UCA 1953 mean anything, they prevent the appellant herein
from pursuing its claim, either for the automobile involved,
or for any part of the purchase price thereof, by any action
in the Courts of this State. It is undisputed that West, a vendor,
failed to deliver the title within 48 hours, or at all, for the
simple reason that he had no title. It is also undisputed that
the plaintiff is West's successor and assignee in interest on
the conditional sales contract.
If Sec. 43-3-3 means what it says, that is, that no action
shall be maintained by the vendor or his successors or assigns,
that seems conclusively to settle the matter and there was no
alternative than for the Court to grant the motion for summary
judgment.

The matter of wa1ver and the inability of a person to
give a binding anticipatory waiver of a right created by statute

23
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

for the protection of the public has been referred to fully in
the arguments heretofore in this brief.
CONCLUSION

We submit that under the facts in this case and from the
_files and the pleadings therein, and under the law, the Court
properly granted the motioru of the respondents herein, namely,
Peters Plumbing & Heating Company, Salt Lake Auto Auction,
Inc. and Indemnity Insurance Company of North America, and
each of them, for summary judgment as against the plaintiff
and appellant herein. The judgment of the Court below should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

ZAR E. HAYES
721 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
OF PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON & WATKJSS,

Attorneys for Respondents Salt Lake Auto
Auction Inc. and Indemnity Imurance
Company of North America,
DAVID K. WATKISS,
Attomey jot' Respondent Peters Plumbing &
Heating Company.
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